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Finding Prejudice from Lost ESI: An Analysis of Courts’
Standards Under Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(e)
I. Introduction
The steep rise in the use of electronic information has dramatically
changed the landscape of the discovery stage of litigation. Much of the
information exchanged during discovery now takes the form of
electronically stored information (ESI). One of the drawbacks of ESI is that
it is prone to spoliation—it is much easier for information contained in
electronic files to be destroyed, either intentionally or inadvertently, before
it can be produced for discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) was
amended in December 2015 in response to the growing prevalence of ESI
and to articulate a clearer standard for courts to apply when dealing with
spoliation of ESI.1
This Note focuses on rule 37(e)(1), which relates to courts’ ability to find
and cure prejudice resulting from spoliation of ESI. Part II discusses how
the 2015 amendment altered rule 37(e) and the goals that the Advisory
Committee sought to pursue in making the changes. Part III explains the
varying standards that district courts have applied when interpreting
subdivision (e)(1)—specifically, how courts have allocated the burden of
proof in showing prejudice and how litigants can satisfy this burden.
Finally, this Note analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of each standard.
II. Background on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)
The previous version of rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provided that,
“[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.”2 This language provided very little
guidance for courts in determining when it was appropriate to impose
sanctions. As a result, courts were inconsistent in the standards that they
adopted for assessing claims of spoliated ESI.3 As the amount of ESI
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Alexander Nourse Gross, A Safe Harbor from Spoliation Sanctions:
Can an Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) Protect Producing Parties?, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 705, 720–22 (noting a circuit split regarding whether a showing of
“bad faith” was necessary before a court could issue severe sanctions).

979

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

980

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:979

rapidly increased over the years, the courts’ lack of clear guidance on the
issue led litigants to take substantial efforts to preserve ESI out of fear of
sanctions.4 The rule thus incentivized the over-preservation of ESI, causing
potential litigants to incur considerable expenses in doing so.5 The Rules
Committee amended rule 37(e) in 2015 to create greater uniformity among
the courts in addressing spoliation of ESI.6
Following the 2015 amendment, rule 37(e) currently reads as follows:
If electronically stored information that should have been
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and
it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery,
the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the
information, may order measures no greater than necessary to
cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation
may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to
the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the
information was unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.7
Under the amended rule, three preliminary elements must be met before
a court can impose any sanctions for spoliation of ESI. First, it must be
shown that the lost information should have been preserved during

4. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, supra
note 3, at 723.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, supra
note 3, at 723; see also Charles Yablon, Byte Marks: Making Sense of New F.R.C.P. 37(e),
69 FLA. L. REV. 571, 574–76 (2017) (arguing that the expenses of over-preservation result
less from storage costs of electronic files and more from the costs of hiring people to sift
through and retrieve ESI).
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
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litigation or in anticipation of it.8 Second, the party must have failed to take
reasonable steps to preserve the information.9 Finally, there must be no way
to replace or restore the destroyed information.10 Once it has been
established that all three prerequisites are met, the court can then impose
sanctions under either subdivision (e)(1) or (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) allows a court to impose sanctions when the spoliation
of ESI has resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.11 Although the
overall goal of the amended rule was to provide clearer guidelines for
assessing spoliation claims, subdivision (e)(1) deliberately leaves judges
with plenty of discretion both in determining whether prejudice exists and
in deciding what type of sanctions to impose.12 It “does not place a burden
of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other.”13 The
Advisory Committee acknowledges that there are situations in which it
might be unfair to place the burden of showing prejudice on the party
seeking sanctions.14 It would probably be reasonable though, the Committee
suggests, for the non-spoliating party to bear this burden when the content
of the lost information is evident, the information is relatively unimportant,
or the remaining preserved information appears sufficient to meet all
parties’ needs.15 However, courts are not bound to these guidelines, and
they ultimately have discretion to assess prejudice on a case-by-case basis.16
The Advisory Committee also distinguishes between a court’s analysis
of prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) and an inquiry into bad faith under
subdivision (e)(2).17 The committee notes list a few possible curative
measures that a court could impose if prejudice is found: forbidding a party
from putting on certain evidence, permitting the parties to present evidence

8. Id.; see also Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-18-D, 2017 WL
2483800, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017) (acknowledging that the duty to preserve evidence
arises not just during litigation but also before litigation where it is reasonably anticipated);
Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV-11-1157-M, 2016 WL 879324, at
*1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2016) (recognizing a duty to preserve evidence when a party knew
or reasonably should have known that litigation is imminent).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
10. Id.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The rule
leaves judges with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases.").
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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and arguments to the jury regarding the loss of information, and giving the
jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of the lost evidence.18 However,
any curative measures granted under subdivision (e)(1) should not have the
effect of measures permitted only under subdivision (e)(2).19 The purpose
of this limitation is that the measures under subdivision (e)(2) are meant to
be punitive, since they require a showing of intent to deprive the opposing
party of the ESI.20 Beyond these basic guidelines, when faced with
spoliation of ESI, courts are given wide discretion in determining how to
assess and cure prejudice.
III. Analysis—Courts’ Application of Rule 37(e)(1)
Since the amendment took effect in December 2015, district courts have
adopted various approaches in addressing prejudice for spoliation of ESI.
When examining pertinent cases across multiple district courts, most courts
have adopted one of three broad positions in allocating the burden of proof
for finding prejudice under subdivision (e)(1): (1) the non-spoliating party
has the burden of proof to show that it has been prejudiced by the
spoliation; (2) the spoliating party has the burden of proof to show lack of
prejudice; and (3) the non-spoliating party has the burden of proof, but the
burden shifts to the spoliating party if it is shown to have acted in bad faith
in destroying the evidence. The cases discussed in this Note are not a
comprehensive list of district court cases addressing rule 37(e)(1), but they
are generally representative of the types of standards that courts have
applied when examining prejudice under the rule.
A. Burden on the Non-Spoliating Party
The first position, which places the burden of proof on the party seeking
sanctions under rule 37(e), is the most frequent approach taken by district
courts.21 The non-spoliating party generally must demonstrate what the
destroyed information may have contained.22 Sometimes a court requires an
additional showing of how the lost information would have aided the
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-18-D, 2017 WL
2483800, at *5 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017); Matthew Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 13cv-04236-BLF, 2016 WL 2957133, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016); Core Labs. LP v.
Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV-11-1157-M, 2016 WL 879324, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 7, 2016).
22. See Eshelman, 2017 WL 2483800, at *5; Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4.
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party’s argument.23 Although district courts have generally applied similar
standards in addressing these two inquiries, they have employed very
different language in articulating them, which results in minor, but not
insignificant, variations across jurisdictions.24
For district courts that have adopted the first position, the non-spoliating
party typically must come forward with some sort of idea as to what the
destroyed evidence contained.25 In determining the appropriate standard, an
important consideration is not to place too heavy a burden on the nonspoliating party, in accordance with the policy goals of the Advisory
Committee to the 2015 amendment.26 The District Court for the Northern
District of California has framed this threshold as requiring “plausible,
concrete suggestions” on the part of the non-spoliating party.27 In Matthew
Enterprise, Inc. v. Chrysler Group LLC, the plaintiff car dealership sent a
letter to a rival car dealership threatening litigation, but afterwards it made
no efforts to preserve internal emails or customer communications, which
were deleted automatically.28 When the defendant sought sanctions for
deletion of the emails, the court declined to grant the motion because the
defendant did not “come forward with plausible, concrete suggestions”
regarding what the internal emails could have contained.29 Therefore, the
defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from the lost emails.30 In
adopting this “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard, the court relied on
language from a previous spoliation case decided prior to the 2015
amendment.31
Although the defendant in Matthew Enterprise could not show prejudice
with regard to the deleted emails, the court nonetheless held that it did meet
its burden of establishing prejudice for the lost customer communications. 32
The defendant identified several instances in which a salesperson for the
23. See, e.g., Living Color Enters., Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-cv-62216,
2016 WL 1105297, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016).
24. Compare Eshelman, 2017 WL 2483800, at *5 (requiring “some evidence regarding
the particular nature of the missing ESI”), with Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4
(requiring “plausible, concrete suggestions”).
25. See Eshelman, 2017 WL 2483800, at *5; Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
27. See Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4.
28. Id. at *1.
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id.
31. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 939, 981 (N.D. Cal.
2012).
32. Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4.
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plaintiff offered a written price quote in its communications with
customers.33 Additionally, the principal owner of the plaintiff dealership
testified that the only way that he oftentimes knew that potential customers
were choosing his company based on price was because he talked with the
customer in person.34 The dealership’s negotiating process and the reasons
why customers chose other dealerships were directly probative to the issues
of the case.35 Because the defendant could show that customer
communications would sometimes reveal relevant information, the court
found that the defendant had sufficiently brought forward “plausible,
concrete suggestions” regarding the contents of the lost ESI.36 The court
therefore held that the defendant met its standard for showing prejudice.37
This case thus shows how one court has required the non-spoliating party to
present specific facts in order to give some sort of plausible idea as to what
kind of information the destroyed evidence contained.38
Some courts have adopted a stricter standard than the court in Matthew
Enterprise, requiring the non-spoliating party to show a higher degree of
specificity in describing the contents of the destroyed information.39 In
Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., the District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina explained that there must be “some evidence
regarding the particular nature of the missing ESI” before the court can
impose sanctions.40 The court rejected the non-spoliating party’s “cursory”
argument that lost web browser history would likely be the most important
evidence for showing that the spoliating party acted with malice in making
a defamatory investor presentation against the non-spoliating party.41
Because it was too difficult for the court to gauge the amount of prejudice
and the appropriate curative measures based on this argument alone, the

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See also TLS Mgmt. & Mktg. Servs. LLC v. Rodriguez-Toledo, No. 15-2121
(BJM), 2017 WL 1155743, at *2 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2017) (finding prejudice where the nonspoliating party “‘plausibly suggest[ed]’ that [the destroyed ESI] ‘might have’ contained
documents or information relevant to this action” (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus,
645 F.3d 1311, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).
39. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-18-D, 2017 WL
2483800, at *5 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017).
40. Id.
41. Id. at *3, *5.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/8

2019]

NOTES

985

evidence produced by the non-spoliating party was insufficient to show
prejudice.42
In contrast with the court in Eshelman imposing a relatively high
standard, the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma has been
considerably more generous in accepting evidence that the non-spoliating
party has met its burden.43 While still requiring the non-spoliating party to
present some evidence regarding the content of the destroyed information,
the court has nonetheless freely permitted inferences to be made based on
the evidence produced.44 In Core Laboratories LP v. Spectrum Tracer
Services, L.L.C., the plaintiff brought two allegations of spoliation against
the defendant: (1) lost emails as a result of the defendant changing its email
provider; and (2) deleted files from an employee’s computer.45 The court
found that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing prejudice for the
deleted computer files because the plaintiff “presented no evidence of the
possible documents that could have been on the hard drive.”46 With respect
to the lost emails though, all emails had been created prior to a specific date
shortly after litigation had commenced.47 Based on this information, the
court inferred that some of the emails must have related to the relevant
issues in the case.48 The court therefore found that there was prejudice
resulting from the lost emails.49 On its face, the court’s decision seems
somewhat inconsistent—the non-spoliating party did not produce much
evidence with respect to either the lost emails or the deleted computer files.
However, the court could better infer what kind of information was
contained within the emails, which was not true of the computer files. In
this case, the court gave considerable weight to reasonable inferences,
thereby making it easier for the plaintiff to meet its burden regarding the
contents of the lost information.50
Even if the non-spoliating party can show some idea regarding the
content of the destroyed information, courts sometimes require the party to

42. Id. at *5.
43. See Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV-11-1157-M, 2016
WL 879324, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2016).
44. See id.
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
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go one step further in showing that the contents are relevant to the case. 51
As such, the non-spoliating party generally must establish that the lost
information helps prove a fact relating to the issues in the case.52 On the
question of the relevance of spoliated information, courts have also applied
varied standards.53
One approach for relevance is the “direct nexus” standard. The District
Court for the Southern District of Florida adopted this standard in Living
Color Enterprises, Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd.54 The plaintiff moved
for sanctions under rule 37(e) due to lost text messages when the defendant
failed to disable a cell phone feature that deleted text messages
automatically after thirty days.55 The plaintiff argued that information
contained in the missing text messages would have shown that the
defendant was involved in a misappropriation scheme.56 The court rejected
this argument, finding that the missing text messages did not prejudice the
plaintiff because the plaintiff did not “explain[] any direct nexus between
the missing text messages and the allegations in its [c]omplaint” regarding
the misappropriation.57 When applying this standard, the court carefully
analyzed the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions to determine whether it
explained why the spoliated information would establish facts necessary to
prove the plaintiff’s allegations.58 The district court’s “direct nexus” test
therefore places a high burden on the non-spoliating party to explain the
relevance of the destroyed information.
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia adopted a lower
standard to show relevance.59 In Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet
Corp., the defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to preserve emails
exchanged between the two parties in litigation over a copyright claim.60
One of the disputed issues was whether the plaintiff communicated its oneyear use limitation to the defendant.61 Because the central issue in the case
51. See, e.g., Living Color Enters., Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-cv-62216,
2016 WL 1105297, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016).
52. See id. at *6.
53. See id.; Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., No. 4:15-CV-0070-HLM,
2016 WL 5339601, at *10 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016).
54. Living Color, 2016 WL 1105297, at *5–6.
55. Id. at *2.
56. Id. at *5.
57. Id.
58. See id. at *5–6.
59. See Virtual Studios, 2016 WL 5339601, at *10.
60. Id. at *1–2.
61. See id. at *10.
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was whether a certain communication took place between the parties, the
lost emails would have been “helpful in evaluating the merits of the Parties’
positions.”62 As such, the court found that the spoliation resulted in
prejudice to the defendant.63 This approach—whether the spoliated
evidence is “helpful” in evaluating the merits of the case—suggests that it
only need be shown that the destroyed evidence would aid in assessing the
validity of each party’s arguments. This method is less demanding than the
“direct nexus” standard, which requires the non-spoliating party to show
how the spoliated information would directly help prove the allegations in
the complaint. Though the differences between the approaches adopted by
the Florida and Georgia district courts are subtle, they demonstrate the
varying degrees of difficulty that the non-spoliating party may face in
meeting its burden of showing prejudice.
Placing the burden of proof to show prejudice on the non-spoliating
party may seem unfair, as it requires the party that has not committed any
wrongdoing to present some idea regarding information that it does not
have—evidence that the opposing party lost or destroyed. The standard
nonetheless makes sense in that it requires the party wishing to impose
sanctions to meet some sort of burden. Importantly, this approach seems to
be the one most favored by district courts, although courts have used
different language in describing how the non-spoliating party must satisfy
the burden. As courts are increasingly placing the burden of proof on the
non-spoliating party to show prejudice, it remains to be seen if any one
standard will emerge as the most commonly used.
B. Burden on Spoliating Party
Although most district courts have placed the burden of proof for
establishing prejudice under rule 37(e)(1) on the non-spoliating party, a
minority of courts have taken the opposite approach, placing the burden of
proof on the party accused of spoliation.64 Under this position, all that the
non-spoliating party need show is that spoliation has occurred; the burden
of proof then shifts to the spoliating party to show that the opposing party
has not been prejudiced by the spoliation.65 This position is justified on the
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See OmniGen Research v. Yongqiang Wang, 321 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D. Or. 2017);
Sec. Alarm Fin. Enters., L.P. v. Alarm Prot. Tech., LLC, No. 3:13-cv-00102-SLG, 2016 WL
7115911, at *6 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2016), aff’d, No. 17-35688, 2018 WL 3615889 (9th Cir.
July 30, 2018).
65. Sec. Alarm, 2016 WL 7115911, at *6.
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basis that the spoliating party is in a better position to establish what
evidence was destroyed and “should not be able to benefit from its
wrongdoing.”66
This approach was most clearly adopted by the District Court for the
District of Alaska in Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, LP v. Alarm
Protection Technology, LLC.67 The case involved two home security
companies—SAFE and APT—that were engaged in extensive litigation
over a number of claims, including defamation and tortious interference
with contractual relationships.68 During discovery, APT sought to obtain
recordings of phone calls that came into SAFE’s call center.69 However,
most of the calls had been overridden—of the thousands of recordings that
had existed, fewer than 150 were still remaining, and most were favorable
to SAFE.70 In APT’s motion for spoliation sanctions, the court placed the
burden of proof on SAFE to show that APT had not been prejudiced from
SAFE’s destruction of evidence.71 According to the court, one way for the
spoliating party to meet its burden is to show that the destroyed evidence is
“available through other means.”72 This inquiry is broader than whether the
information can merely be “restored or replaced,” which is one of the
prerequisites to imposing sanctions in the first place.73 SAFE argued that
the information contained in the lost recordings could be available through
call notes, as well as depositions of the relevant customers.74 The court
rejected these propositions as adequate replacements.75 The call notes, made
by a SAFE employee listening to the recordings, would likely reflect the
employee’s own biases towards the company, and depositions would
require customers to recollect a brief phone call made years earlier.76
Because “the actual recordings would be far more accurate” and inclusive,
the court found that SAFE failed to meet its burden of showing lack of
prejudice and therefore imposed sanctions.77
66.
2012)).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (quoting Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 998 (N.D. Cal.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *7 n.54.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Although there is a strong appeal in placing the burden of proof for
prejudice on the party accused of spoliation, this standard has not gained
much traction among district courts. At least one court has acknowledged
the standard adopted in Security Alarm.78 The rationales underlying the
approach—that the spoliating party is in a better position to know what
evidence was destroyed and should not benefit from its own wrongful
conduct—are persuasive. Although placing the burden on the spoliating
party would be consistent with the Advisory Committee’s concern about
not making it too difficult for the non-spoliating party to show prejudice,
this standard could potentially undermine another goal of the 2015
amendment—to reduce the over-preservation of ESI.79 The previous
version of the rule had led litigants to assume enormous costs in preserving
ESI out of fear of facing sanctions.80 If the spoliating party always had the
burden of showing lack of prejudice, then common litigants would likely
still be incentivized to over-preserve, knowing that they would face an
uphill battle if any lost ESI were challenged. Moreover, such a standard
would probably encourage the non-spoliating party to bring more motions
for sanctions under rule 37(e), since the opposing party would bear the
burden of proof. With these considerations in mind, placing the burden of
proof on the spoliating party may be counterproductive to the purposes of
the 2015 amendment.
Rather than placing the burden of proof on the spoliating party, many
courts concerned about creating too heavy a burden for the non-spoliating
party have given the burden to the non-spoliating party, but have chosen to
relax the standard. For example, the District Court for the Western District
of New York has cautioned against “holding the prejudiced party to too
strict a standard of proof regarding the likely contents of . . . destroyed
evidence.”81 While still requiring the non-spoliating party to produce some
evidence regarding the nature of the spoliated evidence, the court expressed
concern that it would be “unreasonable and unfair” to compel the party to

78. See OmniGen Research v. Yongqiang Wang, 321 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D. Or. 2017).
The case was ultimately decided under rule 37(e)(2), the intent to deprive standard, so it is
unclear how the court’s approach to prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) would have affected
the outcome.
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross,
supra note 3, at 740.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, supra
note 3, at 740.
81. Moody v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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establish that the lost evidence would have been favorable to its claim. 82
The court’s approach in this case is more typical than the standard adopted
in Security Alarm. When concerned about disadvantaging the nonspoliating party, courts are more willing to decrease the burden on the nonspoliating party, instead of placing the burden entirely on the spoliating
party.
C. Bad Faith
The third position for assessing prejudice under rule 37(e)(1) is the “bad
faith” standard. Under this position, the starting point is that the nonspoliating party has the burden of proof.83 If, however, there is evidence
that the spoliating party acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, then
the court may infer that the lost evidence was unfavorable to the party and
that there was prejudice.84 In that case, the burden of proof shifts to the
spoliating party to show lack of prejudice.85 The primary justifications for
this approach are that only the party engaged in the destruction of evidence
can know how much prejudice was caused by the spoliation, and it is
unlikely that the non-spoliating party will be able to prove what was
contained within the destroyed information.86
A small number of courts have taken this approach, most notably the
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Alabama Aircraft
Industries, Inc. v. Boeing Co.87 The case involved two corporations, AAI
and Boeing, that were engaged in a breach of contract dispute after they had
agreed to submit a joint proposal for work on aircraft for the United States
Air Force, but Boeing terminated the agreement.88 After the agreement was
breached, Boeing implemented a Firewall Plan, ordering the preservation
and delivery of all relevant ESI to the law department.89 However, two
employees who were supposed to extract emails from the CFO’s computer
instead deleted the emails.90 Because the CFO was directly involved in the
contract for the joint proposal, and had attended a meeting discussing the
Firewall Plan, the court found that Boeing clearly acted in bad faith when

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 743 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 744.
See id. at 743.
Id. at 743–44.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 736–37.
Id. at 737.
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its employees deleted emails from the CFO’s computer.91 The burden then
shifted to Boeing to show lack of prejudice resulting from the spoliation.92
Boeing failed to meet this “heavy burden” because there was no way to
determine whether the deleted emails were relevant to the underlying
claim.93
Although the “bad faith” standard is appealing because it places a greater
burden on the spoliating party when its conduct appears particularly
wrongful, its biggest drawback is that it runs the risk of overlapping with
the “intent to deprive” requirement already written into rule 37 under
subdivision (e)(2). In enacting the 2015 amendment, the Advisory
Committee intended for the finding of prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) to
be a separate inquiry from the question under subdivision (e)(2) of whether
the spoliating party acted with the intent to deprive the opposing party of
the information.94 The greatest concern was that curative measures granted
under subdivision (e)(1) should not be the same as the remedies permissible
under subdivision (e)(2)—which includes a presumption that the lost
information is unfavorable to the spoliating party, instructions that the jury
may or must presume that the information was unfavorable to that party, or
dismissal of the action altogether.95 Under these guidelines, the “bad faith”
standard would be workable within the framework of subdivision (e)(1) so
long as the remedies granted were not the same as those requiring a
showing of intent to deprive.
The court in Alabama Aircraft somewhat blurs the line between bad faith
and intent to deprive. While mentioning that other courts have suggested
that the “intent to deprive” standard under subdivision (e)(2) “could be
harmonious with the ‘bad faith’ standard,” the court does not definitively
state whether it takes this position.96 It nonetheless clearly treats finding
prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) as a separate inquiry from finding intent
to deprive under subdivision (e)(2).97 In assessing whether Boeing showed
intent to deprive the opposing party of information, the court found that,
while there was no direct evidence on the matter, there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to show that Boeing deleted the emails with the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 744.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id.
Ala. Aircraft, 319 F.R.D. at 746.
See id. at 743–46.
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hopes of concealing the information contained within them.98 This finding
was based on the fact that the emails were “intentionally destroyed by an
affirmative act,” and there was no credible explanation for why the emails
were deleted after employees had been informed of the Firewall Plan.99
Because the “intent to deprive” showing had been satisfied, the court
ordered sanctions consistent with subdivision (e)(2)—that “the court will
instruct the jury that it may presume that the lost information contained in
[the deleted emails] was unfavorable to Boeing.”100 Additionally, Boeing
was ordered to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs in litigating
the motion.101 Although the court found both prejudice under
subdivision (e)(1) by applying the “bad faith” standard and intent to deprive
under subdivision (e)(2), it ordered sanctions only under subdivision (e)(2);
it is unclear whether the other sanctions (i.e., the attorney’s fees and other
costs) were meant to be directed under subdivision (e)(1). For this reason,
the distinction between bad faith and intent to deprive and the effect on the
ultimate curative measures is unclear.
Other courts have also combined the issues of bad faith and intent to
deprive in ways that seem to muddy the rule’s intended purpose.102 GN
Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc. involved an antitrust claim in which one
party accused the other of deleting relevant emails.103 The evidence showed
that the vice president of one of the companies had instructed his employees
to delete some of the emails.104 The District Court for the District of
Delaware stated that the “question of prejudice turns largely on whether a
spoliating party destroyed evidence in bad faith.”105 The court even referred
to the issue as “bad faith with the intent to deprive” the opposing party of
the information.106 After finding that the spoliating party acted in bad faith,
the court then shifted the burden of proof to that party to show lack of
prejudice.107 Upon finding that the spoliating party did not meet this burden,
the court ordered an adverse jury instruction consistent with
98. Id. at 746.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 746–47.
101. Id. at 747.
102. See GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. 12-1318-LPS, 2016 WL 3792833, at
*6–7 (D. Del. July 12, 2016).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. at *6 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 319 (D.
Del. 2013)).
106. Id. at *7.
107. Id. at *9.
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subdivision (e)(2), along with additional monetary and punitive
sanctions.108 Throughout its analysis, the court treated the question of bad
faith and intent to deprive as one and the same.
Though the “bad faith” standard for assessing prejudice under
subdivision (e)(1) could in theory coexist alongside the “intent to deprive”
inquiry under subdivision (e)(2), there is a strong risk of conflating the two
standards in application. The Advisory Committee’s main purpose in
separating these provisions is so that the remedies imposed for a mere
showing of prejudice are not as severe as those imposed for showing intent
to deprive. A court applying the bad-faith standard to its analysis of
prejudice would accord with the committee’s policy as long as the court
made clear that it was imposing remedies under subdivision (e)(1) rather
than subdivision (e)(2). If bad faith and intent to deprive mean essentially
the same thing, however—as the court in Alabama Aircraft hinted at and
the court in GN Netcom stated outright—then a finding of bad faith would
inevitably mean that the party acted with intent to deprive as well. Such a
finding would therefore have a two-fold effect: it would alter the burden of
proof for showing prejudice under subdivision (e)(1), and it would allow for
potential curative measures under subdivision (e)(2). The result would be to
erode the distinction between subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) in cases in
which the court finds bad faith. Because the Advisory Committee expressly
intended for subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) to be treated as separate
inquiries, the “bad faith” standard for assessing prejudice seemingly runs
counter to a significant goal of the 2015 amendment.
IV. Conclusion
Rule 37(e)(1) deliberately leaves judges with wide latitude in
determining whether prejudice has resulted from a party’s spoliation of ESI.
A majority of courts have placed the burden of proof on the non-spoliating
party to show that it has been prejudiced by the loss of evidence. Even
among courts adopting this position though, the standards for what the nonspoliating party must show vary significantly across jurisdictions.
Generally, the non-spoliating party must establish some idea regarding the
content of the lost information, and sometimes must go one step further and
show how that information would be relevant to the party’s underlying
claim. Courts’ requirements to meet this burden range considerably—from
“plausible, concrete suggestions,” to inferential evidence; from showing a
“direct nexus” between the destroyed information and the underlying claim,
108. Id. at *13.
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to merely showing that the information is “helpful in evaluating” the
parties’ claims.
A small number of courts have taken the opposite approach, placing the
burden of proof on the spoliating party to show lack of prejudice, based on
the idea that the spoliating party is more familiar with the contents of the
lost information. In spite of its appeal, this approach has not enjoyed
widespread recognition. Its main drawback is that placing a heavy burden
on the party accused of spoliation might cause litigants to over-preserve
ESI, thereby undermining one of the amended rule’s central policies. The
more common approach is for courts to place the burden of proof on the
non-spoliating party, but to adopt a more relaxed standard for meeting this
burden.
Still other courts have adopted the “bad faith” standard, placing the
burden of showing prejudice on the non-spoliating party initially, but then
shifting the burden to the spoliating party if it is shown to have acted in bad
faith in destroying the evidence. The most problematic aspect of this
approach is that it runs the risk of courts conflating the question of
prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) with the question of intent to deprive
under subdivision (e)(2). In addition to these standards, a number of courts
have analyzed prejudice without articulating a clear standard or giving a
clear indication of how the burden of proof is allocated.109
Based on the competing concerns and district courts’ current trends, the
most desirable position seems to be placing the burden of proof on the nonspoliating party, but adopting a relatively low threshold for meeting this
burden. Of the different standards articulated by the courts, the most
appealing is the “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard recognized in
Matthew Enterprise. One of the main strengths of the standard is that it is
clear and articulable. It provides clarity by informing the non-spoliating
party of what type of evidence it must put forward regarding the nature of
the destroyed evidence—namely, the suggestions must be specific and
realistic based on the evidence. This standard is more helpful than generic
references that the non-spoliating party must produce “some sort of
109. See, e.g., Moody v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2017)
(finding prejudice where a party had to “piece together information from other sources to try
to recover relevant documents” (quoting In re Ethicon, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00497, 2016 WL
5869448, *4 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 6, 2016))); CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164
F. Supp. 3d 488, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The defendants have been prejudiced . . .
because . . . the existence of multiple versions of the same document at the very least
obfuscates the record. . . . Moreover, the defendants have been put to the burden and expense
of ferreting out the malfeasance and seeking relief from the Court.”).
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evidence.” Additionally, the burden on the non-spoliating party is not too
stringent. The suggestions as to what the destroyed evidence may have
contained need only be “plausible,” not likely. Moreover, some courts
recognized the “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard prior to the 2015
amendment, so the standard is not an entirely unfamiliar one.110
The “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard also furthers the goals of
the 2015 amendment. The Advisory Committee, in enacting the 2015
amendment, seemed particularly concerned about placing a heavy burden
on the party seeking sanctions when the content of the lost information was
difficult to determine.111 The committee also sought to leave judges with
enough discretion to decide how best to approach prejudice on a case-bycase basis.112 The “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard does not
impose too harsh a burden on the non-spoliating party so as to make it
especially difficult to impose sanctions. Nor is it so rigid as to eliminate the
discretionary role of judges. As such, there is great appeal for district courts
to adopt this standard on a wider scale.
A primary reason for amending rule 37(e) in 2015 was to ensure greater
uniformity in district courts’ analyses of spoliation of ESI.113 With regard to
subdivision (e)(1) though—whether prejudice resulted from the
spoliation—the Advisory Committee expressly intended to allow for
discretion.114 In light of the varying standards that district courts have
adopted in interpreting this provision, it is too early to determine whether
this flexibility has served the purposes of the amendments or has instead
created too much inconsistency. With particular trends beginning to emerge
among the district courts’ standards—such as an emerging consensus
towards placing the burden of proof on the non-spoliating party, as well as
the problematic tendencies of the “bad faith” standard—future amendments
to the Rules may wish to consider officially adopting a more specific
standard with regard to prejudice in claims of spoliation of ESI.
Thomas J. Joyce

110.
2012).
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 939, 981 (N.D. Cal.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
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